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"G" IS MORE THAN "PC" FOR GEORGIA:
WHY PROSPECTIVE ADOPTION OF ABA
MODEL RULE 8.4(G) IS A VIABLE MEASURE
TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION AND

HARASSMENT
Katie Marie Wroten*
In August 2016, the American Bar Association
passed Model Rule 8.4(g) into its Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The rule declares it misconduct
for a lawyer to harass or discriminate based on race,
sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status. The scope of the rule extends to
lawyers' conduct outside of the courtroom, including
conduct related to the practice of law. The rule aims to
eliminate bias in the profession and justice system.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has yet to adopt any
version of Model Rule 8.4(g) in its comment or black
letter rules. Thirteen states already have a version of
8.4(g) in the comment section of their respective state
rules. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia
have already adopted a version of 8.4(g) into their
black letter rules.
This Note encourages the state of Georgia to adopt
Model Rule 8.4(g) into its state professional ethics
rules. Georgia has strong incentives to adopt 8.4(g).
The rule sends a message to both the public and
attorneys alike that the state of Georgia does not
tolerate biased behavior. The rule also provides a
remedy for inappropriate behaviors by lawyers that
J.D. Candidate, University of Georgia, 2018; B.A., Grand Valley State University,
2015. I would like to thank Lonnie Brown, A. Gus Cleveland Distinguished Chair of Legal
Ethics and Professionalism, Paula Frederick, General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia,
and the Georgia Law Review Volume 52 Editorial Board for their help in developing and
editing this Note.
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would otherwise skirt by unscathed. The rule comports
with both the First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution, as well as Georgia's
Constitution, and sound interpretationof the language
of Rule 8.4(g) accurately targets inappropriateconduct
that currently pervades activities and settings related
to the practiceof law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 2009, a Wisconsin woman and domestic violence
victim received a string of nineteen text messages from the
District Attorney prosecuting her ongoing case. One read, "[a]re
you the kind of girl that likes secret contact with an older married
elected DA ... the riskier the better?"1 Unfortunately, this type of
behavior by an attorney risks going undisciplined, depending on
the state in which it occurs. 2 In this case, however, Wisconsin
offered a remedy: its professional ethics code specifically prohibits3
harassment in connection with a lawyer's professional activities.
Wisconsin modeled its black letter anti-harassment rule off former
comment [3] to American Bar Association Model Rule 8.4. The
American Bar Association (ABA) promulgates Model Rules to
serve as exemplars for state bars and state supreme courts. State
supreme courts ultimately adopt their own versions of the rules to
govern attorneys within their respective jurisdictions. Georgia
currently does not have an anti-discrimination or anti-harassment
rule in its ethical code--cutting against the current nation-wide
trend towards inclusion of such a rule governing professional
misconduct. 4 In response to years of lawyers and organizations
lobbying for change, the ABA House of Delegates (House of
Delegates) passed a new black letter rule into the Rules of
Professional Conduct on August 8, 2016. The new section (g) of
Rule 8.4 reads:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... (g)
engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know is harassment or discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity,
marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct

1 In re Kratz, 851 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Wis. 2014).
2 See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
3 See WIS. SCR 20:8.4(i) (West 2017) ('qt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (i)
harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin,
disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's professional
activities. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate par (i).");
see also In re Kratz, 851 N.W.2d at 230-31 (suspending the attorney for four months and
imposing litigation costs).
4 GA. RuLE 4-102, RPC RULE 8.4 (West 2017).
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related to the practice of law. This paragraph does not
limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or
withdraw from a representation in accordance with
Rule 1.16.
This paragraph does not preclude
legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these
5
Rules.
A majority of states have already adopted some version of an antiharassment and discrimination provision into its state rules. 6
Now, the ABA has followed suit and moved the provision from the
comments to the text of the rule.
This Note explains the advantages of Georgia adopting ABA
Model Rule 8.4(g) and accompanying Comments [3]-[5] into the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Section II offers pertinent
background information.
Part A of Section II explores the
historical background of ABA Model Rule 8, the evolution of 8.4(g)
in sister state jurisdictions, and Georgia's current misconduct rule.
Part B of Section II examines the language of the ABA Model Rule
in context of its historical drafting process. Part C of Section II
explains the policy goals behind the adoption of the rule. Section
III proceeds with the analysis of this Note. Part A of Section III
addresses First Amendment concerns, and Part B addresses due
process concerns. Part IV concludes by inviting Georgia to join the
large majority of states who have moved to adopt an "anti-bias
7
rule."

II.BACKGROUND
The anti-bias rule first emerged in ABA discussions in 1980, at
the promulgation of Rule 8.4. The rule's anti-harassment and
discrimination principles have since been voluntarily incorporated
into a majority of state ethics laws. The Georgia Supreme Court
has not adopted any similar anti-bias language into Georgia's
professional ethics rules or accompanying commentary.

5 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
6 For a state survey, see infra notes 52-53.
7 "Anti-bias rule" will be used to reference ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).
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A. HISTORY

"Lawyer self-regulation has been defended as both traditional
8
and necessary for effective service to the public." Recognizing the
need for self-governance and development in the legal profession,
seventy-five lawyers established the American Bar Association
(ABA) in 1878. 9 The ABA promulgates model rules to govern
10
In Georgia, the Rules of
lawyers and the legal profession.
"help define a lawyer's
to
recognized
Professional Conduct are
1
obligations to clients, to the judicial system, and to the public."
State supreme courts reserve the ultimate authority to govern
lawyers, but state bars develop, draft,
disciplinary actions against
12
rules.
state
and oversee
The ABA first introduced regulation of the legal field in the
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics.1 3 The forty-seven canons did
1 4 In 1969, the ABA
not specifically address attorney misconduct.
promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
incorporated canon principles and replaced the canons as the
governing rules. 15 The code introduced the concept of lawyer
16
In 1977, the ABA
misconduct in DR 1-102(A) and DR 9-101(C).
8 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 20 (1986).
9 See History of the American Bar Association, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.
orglabouttheaba/history.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2017) (providing an overview of the
organization's history and purpose).
10 Id.
11 Ethics & Professionalism, STATE BAR OF GA., https://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsan
dprofessionalismindex.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
12 Id. (explaining that the Supreme.Court of Georgia has the ultimate authority to govern
the legal profession); see also In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268, 1272 (N.J. 1981) (assuring that
the courts have the power to regulate the legal practice, starting with admissions and
ending with disbarment).
13 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model-rulesofprofessional-conduct.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (explaining the history of the ABA Model Rules, including
the original 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics).
14 See CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, 62 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 1105, 1105-22 (1937) (addressing,
among other topics: conflicting interests, fees, candor and fairness, advocacy tactics in the
courtroom, litigation responsibilities, confidentiality, advertising, and aiding in the
unauthorized practice of law).
165See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (AM. BAR ASS'N 1969) (explaining
how the new Model Code revised and replaced the canons); see also Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, supra note 13 (explaining the history of the ABA rules).
16 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1969)
(addressing lawyer misconduct, stating "(A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Violate a Disciplinary
Rule; (2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another; (3) Engage in illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude; (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
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appointed a Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
(Kutak Commission) to draft a revised set of rules.1 7 The Kutak
Commission felt the reformatted rules provided for a more concise
and user-friendly guide for lawyers.1 8
The Commission first
proposed a discussion draft in 1980, presented'a final draft in
1981, and gave four reports to the House of Delegates between
1982 and 1983.19 The resulting rules included Model Rule 8.4.20
1. ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). Adopted after the Kutak proposals
and revisions in 1983,21 the modern Model Rules of Professional
Conduct specifically address lawyer misconduct in Rule 8.4.22 The
concept of Rule 8.4 originally appeared in a 1980 Discussion Draft
(then designated as Rule 10.4), addressing crimes and deliberately
wrongful acts that reflect adversely on the practice of law. 23 The
Kutak Commission recommended adoption of that version of Rule
8.4 at the 1982 Annual Meeting, and the ABA debated the rule at
the February 1983 Midyear Meeting. 24 At that meeting, sponsors
proposed five amendments to Rule 8.4: one amendment was
adopted, two were defeated, one was withdrawn, and one was
deceit, or misrepresentation." (footnotes omitted)); id. at DR 9-101(C) (addressing avoiding
the appearance of impropriety, stating "(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able
to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public
official." (footnote omitted)).
17 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, 1982-2013, at vii (Art Garwin ed., 2013) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]
(explaining the appointment of the Kutak Commission and its purpose); see also Kutak
Commission Drafts, Am.BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-resp
onsibility/resources/report-archive/kutakcommissiondrafts.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017)
(noting that the Kutak Commission drafted the Model Rules later adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in 1983).
18 See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at xiv ("The Commission felt that the
tripartite format of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was unique when
adopted in 1969, did not provide a convenient way for lawyers to determine their obligations
in specific circumstances.").
19 See Kutak Commission Drafts, supra note 17, at 849-50 (providing a timeline of the
different drafts produced by the Kutak Commission).
20 See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 849-50 (noting that Model Rule 8.4 was
adopted at the August 1983 ABA Annual Meeting after the Kutak Commission's
recommendation).
21 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 13 (explaining the Kutak
Commission's vote in the drafting history of the Model Rules).
22 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
23

STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAwYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 526

(Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2015).
24 See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
recommendation was filed as Report 400).

17,

at 849-50

(denoting
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adopted in part and withdrawn in part. 25 At that time, the first
version of an anti-harassment and discrimination proposal
surfaced. 26 The Iowa State Bar Association proposed paragraph
(i), which read: "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to... engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law," but it subsequently withdrew the
proposal. 27 The ABA partially adopted another portion of Iowa's
proposal, adding paragraph (d), which prohibits "conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice" and appears in the

current version of Model Rule

8.4.28

Another proposal for an ABA anti-bias rule did not surface for
another ten years. In 1994, at the ABA's February Mid-Year
Meeting, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (Standing Committee) and the ABA Young Lawyers
Division submitted two different proposed versions for a novel
section 8.4(g). 29 The Young Lawyers Division explained the need
for a new rule encompassing discriminatory misconduct, to "avoid
the inexplicable nuances of a rule which would allow reprehensible
behavior to go unchecked merely because it is calculatedly inflicted
outside the courtroom or after a case is concluded. '30 It proposed:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... (g)
commit a discriminatory act prohibited by law or to
harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed,
religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual
orientation or marital status, where the act of
discrimination or harassment is committed in
connection with a lawyer's professional activities.31
The Standing Committee proposed a slightly different amendment:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... (g)
knowingly manifest by words or conduct, in the course
See id. (also adopting Iowa State Bar Association's proposed paragraph (b) and (c)).
Id. at 851 (providing the text of the Iowa State Bar Association's proposed amendment
and denoting withdrawal).
27 Id.; see also id. at 852 (rejecting a similar proposal by the Florida Bar).
28 Id. at 851.
29 GILLERS ET AL., supra note 23, at 526-27.
30 Id. at 527.
31 Id. at 526-27.
25
26
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of representing a client, bias or prejudice based upon
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socio-economic status.
This
paragraph does not apply to a lawyer's confidential
communications to a client or preclude legitimate
32
advocacy with respect to the foregoing factors.
The two proposals, while offering the same idea, proffered two
separate versions of a rule. The Young Lawyers Division's version
did not include a mens rea requirement, did not limit conduct to
representation of a client but instead intended a broader scope of
professional activities, and included a longer enumerated list of
protected groups. 33 Both proposals were withdrawn, possibly
because the Standing Committee and Young Lawyers Division
feared a lack of general support. 34 The chance of revisiting an
8.4(g) proposal seemed unlikely in 1995, when the ABA Ethics
Committee Chair expressed doubt as to the Committee's ability to
draft a rule to conform with the First Amendment and due
process. 35 Instead, the House of Delegates passed an aspirational
Policy Resolution by a 80-70 vote, serving as an alternative in
support of the rule's ideals. 36 Yet shortly after, in 1998, the
Standing Committee offered a new comment to accompany Rule
8.4(d), to help define what is "prejudicial to the administration of
justice." 37 Comment [2] (which was later renumerated and has
since been replaced with the new rule, herein referred to as
"former comment [3]") read:

32

Id.

33 Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice:A Guide for

State Courts ConsideringModel Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 203 (2017).
3 See Proceedings of the 1994 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 119 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 1, 18 (1994) (noting the Standing Committee Chair's hope "that with additional time
for commentary, a single proposal commanding general support could be developed...");
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INCLUDING PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFTY- SEVENTH MIDYEAR MEETING OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 18 (1994); see also Gillers,

supra note 33, at 203 (speculating that both the Standing Committee and Young Lawyers
Division expected to lose in front of the House).
31 Gillers, supra note 33, at 204 ("[T]he Standing Committee... determined that no
disciplinary rule could be drawn that would, to its satisfaction, meet standards of... due
process, and also would not duly impinge on the First Amendment.").
86 Proceeding of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 120 ANN. REP. A-B.A.
1, 61 (1995).
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1998).
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A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client,
knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national
age,
sexual
orientation
or
origin,
disability,
socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when
such actions are prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing
38
factors does not violate paragraph (d).
The comment passed in 1998 by voice vote 39 after adding a
sentence specifically exempting preemptory challenges as a rule
40
violation.
Advocates still pushed further, and the development of Rule 8.4
did not end in 1998. Comments in the Model Rules do not carry
the same weight as the black-letter Model Rules, and thus
41
comments are considered to be guiding but not obligatory.
Former comment [3] was problematic because it did not apply to
lawyers outside the context of tribunals, did not include
misconduct outside the representation of a client (for example, at a
law firm), and was somewhat redundant to paragraph (d) because
it did not flesh out exactly what conduct was prejudicial. 42 In the
opinion of Rule 8.4(g) advocates, the scope and optional
enforcement of the comment failed to capture significant
43
occurrences of discrimination and harassment.
In a May 2014 letter, the ABA's Goal III Commissions 44 lobbied
for the House to reconsider a black-letter rule. The ABA's Goal III
Commissions-including the Commission on Women in the
Profession, the Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the
Profession, the Commission on Disability Rights, and the
38 Rep. of the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, 123 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
81, 81 (1998).
39 Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 123 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1,
46 (1998).
40 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1998) ("A trial
judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does
not alone establish a violation of this rule.").
41 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
42 See Gillers, supra note 33, at 207 (highlighting gaps and pitfalls in the scope of the
former comment's language).
43 Id.
44 See generally Goal III, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/disabilityri
ghts/initiatives awards/goal_3.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (discussing the goals and
objectives).
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Commission on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identitychallenged the ABA to reconsider issues of discrimination and
harassment in the legal profession through the lens of the Model
Rules. 45 ABA Goal III is titled "Eliminate Bias and Enhance
46
Diversity" and is one of the organization's four core missions.
The second objective of Goal III aims to eliminate bias in the legal
profession and justice system. 47 In 1998, the ABA had not yet
adopted Goal III into policy, had not yet established the
Commission on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and the
three other Goal III Commissions did not participate in the 1998
record. 48 In support of their request for reconsideration, the
Commissions cited several recent advancements in the legal field
that were developed to protect those at risk of discrimination, as
well as the integrity of the legal profession. 49 The advancements
included changes in state ethics rules, changes in ABA Model
Codes, and similar rule adoptions by other professional
50
associations.
2. Momentum in the States. Perhaps most influential is the
state-wide trend towards an anti-bias rule in ethics. Thirteen
states, including Georgia, do not feature a form of the anti-bias
rule in its rules or comments. 51 In contrast, thirteen jurisdictions
have adopted an anti-bias provision into their comment section to
guide application of the accompanying rule. 52 Twenty-four states
41 Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(G)
Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship,4 J. LEGAL PROF.
201, 212 (2017).
46 See generally Goal III, supranote 44.
41 See id. (summarizing goals).
48 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Revised Resolution 109 Rep., at 2 (Aug.
2016), https://www.americanbar.orgtontent/dam/aba/administrative/professionaLresponsibii
ty/final revisedresolutionand-report_109.authcheckdam.pdf.
49 Memorandum from the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, to the Am.
Bar Ass'n 6 (Dec. 22, 2015).
50 See generally id.
51 Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have elected not to address the
issue yet. See generally ALA. RPC (West 2017); ALASKA RPC (West 2017); HAW. S. CT. RPC
(West 2017); RULE 226 KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (West 2017); KY. SCR 3.130
(Baldwin 2017); LA. T. 37, CH. 4, ART. XVI (West 2017); MiSS. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT
(West 2017); MONT. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT (West 2017); NEV. RPC (West 2017); OKL. ST.
ANN. T. 74 CH. 62 APPX. 1 (2017); PA. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT (Purdon 2017); VA. RULES
OF PROF. CONDUCT (West. 2017).
62 ARIZ. SUP. CT. RULE 42 ER 8.4 cmt. 3 (2017); ARK. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4
cmt. 3 (West 2017); CONN. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4 cmt. (2017); DEL. RULES OF
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and the District of Columbia took initiatives even further,
53
adopting a form of the comment into their black-letter rules.
Some states made adoptions as early as 1994, 54 whereas five states
have adopted some version within the last five years. 55 One
author speculates that the changing nature of the legal profession,
specifically the increase in women and minority groups in the
profession as of late, has propelled movement towards adoption of
the rule. 56 Since the language in the ABA's Model Rule 8.4(g) is
broader than any state rule, 57 states will likely soon revisit their
own respective rules and comments to consider the ABA's
linguistic suggestions. Georgia might consider doing the same.
3. Georgia Misconduct Rule 8.4. The Supreme Court of Georgia
promulgates the state's ethical rules; it has included portions of
ABA Model Rule 8.4 into its misconduct section.58 Georgia's
ethical rules governing lawyers originated in its Canon of Ethics,
but in January 2001, the state adopted language from the ABA's
PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4 cmt. 3 (West 2017); ME. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RULE 8.4 cmt.
3 (2017); N.C. STATE BAR RULES CH. 2 RULE 8.4 cmt. 5 (West 2017); N.H. RULES OF PROF.
CONDUCT RULE 8.4 cmt. 3 (2017); S.C. APPELLATE CT. RULE 407 RPC RULE 8.4 cmt. 3
(2017); SDCL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT APPENDIX TO CH. 16-18 RULE 8.4 cmt. 3 (2017);
TENN. SUP. CT. RULES RPC 8.4 cmt. 3 (West 2017); UTAH RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE
8.4 cmt. 3 (West 2017); W. VA. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4 cmt. 3 (West 2017); WYO.
RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4 cmt. 3 (West 2017).
53 CAL. PROF. CONDUCT RULE 2-400 (West 2017); COLO. RPC RULE 8.4(g) (2017); RULES
REGULATING THE FLA. BAR RULE 4-8.4(d) (2017); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RULE
4.4(a) (2017); ILL. S. CT. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4(j) (West 2017); IND. RULES OF
PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4(g) (West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. RULE 32:8.4(g) (West 2017); MICH.
MRPC RULE 6.5 (2017); MINN. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4(h) (West 2017); MO. S. CT.
RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE 4-8.4(g) (West 2017); NEB. CT. R. OF PROF. COND. § 3-508.4(d)
(LexisNexis 2017); N.J. RPC 8.4(g) (West 2017); N.M. STATE CT. RULES 16-300 (West 2017);
N.Y. RULES OF PROF. CON. RULE 8.4(g) (McKinney 2017); N.D.R. PROF. CONDUCT RULE 8.4(0
(West 2017); OHIO PROF. COND. RULE 8.4(g) (LexisNexis 2017); OR. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT
RULE 8.4(a)(7) (West 2017); R.I. SUP. CT. ART. V, RULE 8.4(d) (LexisNexis 2017); TEX. GOVT.
CODE ANN. T. 2, SUBT. G APP. A, ART. 10, § 9, RULE 5.08 (West 2017); VT. PROF. COND. RULE
8.4(g) (LexisNexis 2017); WASH. RPC RULE 8.4(g) (2017); WIS. SCR 20:8:4(i) (West 2017); D.C.
RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RULE 9.1 (West 2017).
4 See, e.g., CAL PROF. CONDUCT RULE 2-400 (West 2017); N.J. RPC 8.4(g) (West 2017);
TEX. GOVT. CODE ANN. T. 2, SUET. G APP. A, ART. 10, SEC. 9, RULE 5.08 (West 2017).
65 See, e.g., Lydia E. Lavelle, NondiscriminationRules with Regard to Sexual Orientation:
A Survey of the Rules of Professional Conduct in the Fifty States, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 237,
247, 249, 255, 260, 262-63 (2015) (identifying that Connecticut, Missouri, South Carolina,
Utah, and Wisconsin added anti-bias provisions after 2012).
56 Gillers, supra note 33, at 197.
57 Id. at 198, 208 (noting that six jurisdictions include a knowledge requirement, only
four jurisdictions use the term "harass," and four jurisdictions limit conduct that is
prohibited by other state or federal anti-discrimination law).
58 GA. RULE 4-102, RPC RULE 8.4 (West 2017).
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Model Rules, resulting in a hybrid rule of both texts. 59 Georgia
does not specifically address anti-discriminatory behavior in its
rules. Georgia's Misconduct Rule does not adopt 8.4(d)-(f) of the
ABA Model Rules, nor has it adopted former comment [3].60 This
means that lawyers subject to Georgia's misconduct rule elude the
"catchall" provision that bans conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. The absence of this provision, as well as
the absence of any anti-bias provision, makes it difficult for the
Supreme Court of Georgia and the Georgia State Bar to sanction
attorneys for inappropriate behavior.
4.
The Final Stretch. Goal III Commissions made two
additional points in support of reconsideration. First, the ABA
Model Code had recently undergone a series of changes. In 2007,
the House of Delegates adopted Rule 2.3 into the ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, preventing judges from engaging in
prejudicial behavior or harassment based on extrajudicial
factors. 61 Furthermore, in February 2015, the House of Delegates
adopted 3-1.6 and 4.16 into the text of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function.
This barred prosecution and defense attorneys from manifest
prejudiced words or conduct.62 Also, many other professions have
amended their guidelines to prevent misconduct, including: the
American Association of University Professors, the American
Counseling Association, the American Dental Association, the
69 Canons of Ethics, GA. STATE BAR (2001), https://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandpro
fessionalismlupload/Ethics-Discipline-Before-2001.pdf.
60 GA. RULE 4-102, RPC RULE 8.4(a) (West 2017) ("It shall be a violation of the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to: (1) violate or knowingly attempt to violate the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another; (2) be convicted of a felony; (3) be convicted of a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to
practice law; (4) engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; (5) fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such
lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time
appointed in the order or judgment; (6) [influence]; (7) knowingly assist a judge or judicial
officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or (8)
commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer
has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act."); see also GILLERS ET AL., supra note
23, at 531-32 (noting that "Georgia deletes ABA Model Rules 8.4(d)-(f)").
61 Memorandum from the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, supra
note 49, at 6 ("[B]ased upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability,
age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.").
62 Id. at 6-7.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2017

13

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2017], Art. 11

354

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:341

American Institute of Architects, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, the American Medical Association,
the American Nurses Association, the American Psychological
Association, the National Association of Social Workers, the
National Education Association, and National Realtors.6 3 Many
legal organizations outside of the ABA-including the Association
of Professional Responsibility Lawyers, the Chicago Bar
Association, the National Affinity Bars, and the National
Association of Women Lawyers-voiced support for Rule 8.4(g)
64
during the most recent adoption process.
Following the May 2014 letter, the Ethics Committee yet again
proposed drafts of Rule 8.4(g) for comments in July 2015,
December 2015, and April 2016.65 The July 2015 draft specifically
considered the scope of the rule, and whether to narrow it to
conduct while "engaged in the practice of law" or to broaden the
scope to "engaged in conduct related to the practice of law." 66 The
current 8.4(g) boasts broader language and regulates lawyers'
behavior outside the courtroom and outside interactions with
The May 2016 revision included a knowledge
clients. 67
requirement-requiring that a lawyer "knows or reasonably
should know" that his conduct is prohibited-to avoid strict
liability application of the rule.6 8 After an extensive comment
participation period, 69 the ABA House of Delegates finally
approved Resolution 109 at its Annual Meeting on August 8,

See id. app. (giving examples of similar provisions in these organizations' codes of ethics).
See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional-responsibility/committees-commissions/ethicsandprofessionalrespo
nsibility/modruleprofconduct8_4.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (listing supporters and
co-sponsors of the amendment to Rule 8.4).
65 See Gillers, supra note 33, at 211 ('The Ethics Committee released draft rules and
comments in July 2015, December 2015, and April 2016.').
6 See id. at 211-12 (describing the differences between the two alternate phrasings of
the rule).
67 See id. at 212 ("[Imn the December 2015 draft.., the nexus option became 'conduct
related to the practice of law.' ").
68 See id. at 213 ('The most consequential change in the Revised Resolution is the
addition of a state of mind requirement... for both discrimination and harassment."); see
also id. at 217 (speculating that the knowledge requirement was added as a matter of policy
and to garner support).
69 A complete list of comments from the December 2015 meeting can be found at Comments
to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.Americanbar.org/gro
ups/professional-responsibility/committees coniissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/
modruleprofconduct8_4/mr_8 4 comments.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
&

64
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2016. 70

In addition, the new rule includes three pertinent
comments clarifying issues brought up during the editing and
adoption process, which help guide application.7 1
B. THE "ANTI-BIAS" RULE

To understand the constitutional concerns raised by critics of
Rule 8.4(g), it is helpful to understand how the framers of the rule
intended the language to apply. The following three sections
address key phrases in the rule: "harassment or discrimination,"
"knows or reasonably should know," and "related to the practice of
law," as well as the enumerated list of protected groups.
1. ProhibitedConduct. The former comment [3] to 8.4(d), which
Rule 8.4(g) grew out of, used the language "manifests by words or
conduct, bias or prejudice" to describe prohibited conduct.7 2 Rule
8.4(g) now adopts "harassment or discrimination" to describe what
conduct is expected of lawyers.7 3 The terms "harassment" and
"discrimination" are also found in Georgia statutes, 74 Georgia case
law, 75 and Judicial Codes.7 6 Harassment and discrimination have
been described to refer to "adverse, negative consequences of
conduct that manifests bias or prejudice." 77 Moreover, the new
comment [3] to Rule 8.4 helps to define discrimination as including
"harmful verbal or physical conduct" and harassment as including
"sexual harassment and derogatory or demeaning verbal or
physical conduct," and it does not limit the terms to these
70 See generally Annual Meeting 2016: ABA Amends Model Rules to Add AntiDiscrimination,Anti-Harassment Provision, AM. BAR ASS'N (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.
americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2016/08/annual-meeting 20161.html.
71 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the text of comments [3]-[5].
72 See Memorandum from the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, supra
note 49, at 3 (quoting the relevant portion of former comment [3] that was used to construct
current Rule 8.4(g)).
73 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

74 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 8-3-202 (2015) (prohibiting discrimination in sale and rental of
property); O.C.G.A. § 45-19-22(4) (2016) (defining "discrimination" for employment purposes).
75 See, e.g., Coleman v. Hous. Auth. of Americus, 381 S.E.2d 303, 305 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(contrasting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and common law causes of actions).
76 See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (2016) ("A judge shall not ... by words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment ... based upon age, disability,
ethnicity, gender or sex, marital status, national origin, political affiliation, race, religion,
sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status."); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(C) (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2010) (citing nearly identical language as Georgia's Judicial Code).
77 Memorandum from the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, supra
note 49, at 4.
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definitions. 78 Comment [3] also denotes that substantive law may
serve as a guidance for application. 79 Noting this in the comment
but not in the rule shows that substantive law may not always be
dispositive.8 0 After all, disciplinary actions under the rules are
different than rights to a civil suit, and Rule 8.4(g)'s language was
not intended to expand the understanding and application of the
terms harassment and discrimination. 8 Rather, comment [3] aims
to guide application of the rule to ease overbreadth concerns
surrounding the terms.8 2 By defining the terms in this way, Rule
8.4(g) aims to capture behavior egregious enough to demand
reprimand, but limited enough to provide individuals adequate
notice of what constitutes prohibited behavior.
The new comment [5] to Rule 8.4 specifically addresses two
contexts which do not amount to harassing or discriminatory
behavior: peremptory challenges and limiting the scope or subject
matter of practice to underserved populations.8 3 The comment
reads "[a] trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were
exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a
violation of paragraph (g). A lawyer does not violate paragraph (g)
by limiting the scope or subject matter of the lawyer's practice or
by limiting the lawyer's practice to members of underserved
,,84 Rule 8.4(g) does
populations in accordance with these Rules ....
not specifically take a stance on peremptory challenges due to
concerns raised to the Standing Committee drafters regarding

78 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

79 Id.

80 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Revised Resolution 109 Report, supra
note 48, at 7 (explaining that because comment [3] explicitly provides that case law acts as
mere guidance when applying paragraph (g), it becomes clear that the substantive law
regarding anti-discrimination and anti-harassment is not automatically dispositive in the
disciplinary setting).
81 See id. (explaining that discriminatory conduct might be dispositive of disciplinary
action in other contexts, but discriminatory conduct does not automatically result in
discipline under Rule 8.4(g)); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope
[20] (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) ("Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of [legal]
action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal
duty has been breached.... [the rules] are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.").
82 See infra Part IH.B (explaining that by clearly defining the terms "harassment,"
"discrimination," and "related to the practice of law" in comment [3], Rule 8.4(g) is not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).
83 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
84

Id.
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limits to trial judges' ability to refer lawyers' conduct for
85
discipline.
2. Knowledge Requirement. Rule 8.4(g) also contains a
knowledge requirement, prohibiting conduct that a lawyer "knows
or reasonably should know" is harassment or discrimination.8 6 As
noted above, the Young Lawyers Division proffered a version sans
mens rea requirement, but the standard was added back into the
final rule by the Standing Committee in response to comments
from attorneys fearing accidental violations.8 7 ABA's Model Rule
1.0(f) and (j) provide further guidance by defining each of the
phrases' terms. Actual knowledge in 1.0(f) is defined as "actual
knowledge of the fact in question .... [and] [a] person's knowledge
may [also] be inferred from circumstances."8 8
Per 1.0(j),
reasonable knowledge is held to an objective inquiry when "a
lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain
the matter in question."8 9 These mens rea standards are used
throughout the rules. 90 This standard is provided to guide both
lawyers in their practice as well as to guide disciplinary
authorities in application of the standard. 91 The knowledge
requirement additionally protects lawyers in non-discriminatory
situations, such as hiring decisions spearheaded to promote
diversity. 92 Expounding on the idea of protecting hiring practices,
Rule 8.4 comment [4] provides that "[l]awyers may engage in
conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without
violating this Rule by, for example, implementing initiatives aimed
at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or
sponsoring diverse law student organizations." 93
3. Scope of Conduct and Protected Groups. Perhaps the most
controversial portion of the new rule is that it captures "conduct
85 Memorandum from the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof1 Responsibility, supra

note 49, at 5.
86

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

87

See supra pp. 348-49 (discussing the proposal history of Rule 8.4(g)).

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0(j) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
88

go See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT rr. 1.13(f), 2.3(b), 2.4(b), 3.6(a), 4.3, 4.4(b)
(AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
91 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Revised Resolution 109 Report, supra
note 48, at 7 (explaining the Committee added those to provide guidance).
92 See generally Memorandum from the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl
Responsibility, supra note 57.
93 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
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related to the practice of the law." 94 Those in opposition argue that
the language casts too wide a net, leaving lawyers vulnerable to
discipline in virtually any situation. 95 However, comment [4] helps
to define and limit the scope by explaining that the rule includes
"representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court
personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice of law;
operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and
participating in bar association, business or social activities in
connection with the practice of law." 96 The comment's emphasis on
"connection" enforces the idea that "[t]he nexus of the conduct
regulated by the rule ...is conduct lawyers are permitted or
97
required to engage in because of their work as a lawyer."
Therefore, the rule does not seek to rigorously mandate private
behavior but only lawyers' conduct while engaged in their
98
profession.
In addition to the enumerated protected groups in former
comment [3] (race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status), Rule 8.4(g) now
includes gender identity, marital status, and ethnicity.99 These
new categories are intended to capture, for example, individuals
who identify with genders different than their birth designation,
single parents, and those who are of "mixed national origins or
races." 100 Although the breadth of these categories has faced
opposition, 10 1 the protected groups are widely recognized in
substantive law, which may provide for guidance in applying the
rule. 102

94 See infra note 101 (referring to a letter written by fifty-two members of the ABA
expressing opposition to the addition of an anti-bias provision).
95 See infra note 101.
96 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
97 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Revised Resolution 109 Report, supra
note 48, at 9.
98 See id. at 10 (advocating that the rule will be helpful in regulating mentoring and
social activity).
99 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
100 Memorandum from the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, supra
note 49, at 4-5.
101 Memorandum from 52 ABA Member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm. 19-20
(December 2015) (citing "gender identity" and "socioeconomic status" as overly vague terms
and impossible to define); see infra Part III.
102 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profs Responsibility, Revised Resol. 109 Rep., supra note
48, at 5 (noting Goal III influences many other actions the Association takes).
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C. A DUAL PURPOSE

Because there is no ethical rule for disciplining discrimination
and harassment by lawyers in Georgia, it is impossible to
articulate how often the behavior occurs. It does in fact occur,
however. 10 3 Additionally, case law from other states that have
versions of 8.4(g) in their rules and comments affirm that
10 4
situations arise in which application of the rule is appropriate.
In the 2015-2016 fiscal year, the State Bar of Georgia received
10 5
3,219 requests for grievance forms, and 2,253 filed grievances.
These numbers show that citizens and lawyers actually do report
to the state bar about attorney behavior frequently. However,
absent a rule for imposing meaningful consequences, reporting
discriminatory or harassing conduct is in vain. Adopting ABA
Model Rule 8.4(g) in Georgia has the potential to serve two
purposes. First, it can communicate to Georgia's citizens that
lawyers practicing in the state do not tolerate harassment and
discrimination. Second, it can serve as an effective prophylactic
tool to better tackle disciplinary issues that arise in the future.
1. Public Statement. State bar associations sanction a large
majority of attorney misconduct, leaving courts to "serve as the
largely passive sounding boards and official approvers or
disapprovers of initiatives taken by lawyers operating through bar
associations."'0 6 Because state bar associations largely determine
what types of professional behavior should be prosecuted, 10 7 it is
important for the organizations to set the tone for what behavior is
and is not tolerated in the legal profession. A recent national poll
reflected that 34% of the public ranked the honesty and ethical
standards of lawyers in the 'low or very low" category-a glaringly
high percentile when compared with doctors (7%), pharmacists
103 Interview with Paula Frederick, Gen. Counsel, State Bar of Ga., in Athens, Ga. (Nov.
14, 2016) (explaining that the bar has faced situations in which an attorney's biased
conduct did not fall within the scope of the Georgia ethics rules and therefore went
undisciplined).
104 See, e.g., In re Garofalo, 160 A.3d 1291, 1292 (N.J. 2017) (mem.) (ordering that an
attorney be suspended from practicing law for six months, partly because he "engag[ed] in,
in a professional capacity, [ I conduct involving discrimination").
105 Interview with Paula Frederick, supra note 103; see also THE STATE BAR OF GA., 2016
REP. OF THE OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNS. 1, 2, 39-43 (2016) (providing an overview of
disciplinary actions by the Supreme Court of Georgia).
106 WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 33-34.
107 Id.
at 101 ("Most jurisdictions today rely on a full-time bar counsel to handle screening
and to make decisions about prosecuting complaints.").
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(7%), and clergy (13%).108 This perceived lack of trust is not a
recent development, but rather, an issue that the profession has
A rule addressing discriminatory
recognized for decades. 10 9
behavior could boost public confidence that the State Bar of
Georgia works to combat such inappropriate behavior. Upholding
public confidence in the legal profession also generally fosters
trust in lawyers as professionals, which can have a positive effect
on the relationship between attorneys and their clients. Building
an environment conducive to strong attorney-client relationships
can lead to higher quality legal services.
Adopting Rule 8.4(g) could also work to assure Georgia citizens
and attorneys that the bar is taking affirmative steps towards
creating an environment of inclusion and equity within the legal
profession. The most recent ABA statistics indicate that 65% of
lawyers are male and 35% are female, and that minorities make
up 33% of the profession. 110 The ABA's data indicates that the
legal field is becoming more diverse.1 Essentially, even if there is
not any glaring need for Rule 8.4(g) as a disciplinary tool, the rule
still works as a policy matter by emphasizing that the state bar
does not tolerate harassment and discrimination.
2. Notice to Lawyers. Rule 8.4(g) adoption received sweeping
support from ABA members in the legal profession. 11 2 At the
August 2016 meeting, the rule overwhelmingly passed by voice
vote.1 13 This enthusiastic support for the new rule suggests that
those in the trenches of the profession recognize the need for such

Rebecca Riffkin, Americans Rate Nurses Highest on Honesty, Ethical Standards,
GALLUP (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/180260/americans-rate-nurses-highesthonesty-ethical-standards.aspx?g-source=lawyers&g-medium=search&g-campaign--ties.
109 See generally Dennis E. Hensley, Why People Don't Like Lawyers, and What You Can
Do About It, 70 A.B.A. J. 90 (1984); Stuart E. Hertzberg, Watergate: Has the Image of the
Lawyer Been Diminished?,79 COM. L.J. 73 (1974).
110 ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, 10-Year Trend in Lawyer Demographics, AM.
BAR ASS'N (2017), https://www.americanbar.orglcontent/dam/aba/administrative/marketrese
arch/National$20Lawyer%2OPopulation%2ODemographics%202007-2017.authcheckdam.pdf.
111 See id. (showing that minorities represent a growing percentage of the legal profession).
112 See Peter Geraghty, ABA Adopts New Anti-Discrimination Rule 8.4(g), AM. BAR ASS'N
(Sept. 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2016/September-2016/aba-ad
opts-anti-discrimination-rule-8-4-g--at-annual-meeting-in-.html ("No one spoke in opposition
[to the proposed rule at the House of Delegates annual meeting], and the rule was adopted by
a voice vote."); see also Gillers, supra note 33, at 197 (stating that the initial opposition to the
early drafts of Rule 8.4(g) "had largely receded by the time the final text came to a vote').
113 See Gillers, supra note 33, at 197 (estimating that the "yays" outnumbered the "nays"
to the resolution by a ratio of ten to one).
108
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a rule. Perhaps the problem is more pervasive than the public
realizes-swept under the rug for lack of any alternative. Support
for the Model Rule is further garnered by looking to a majority of
the ethics rules in the fifty states. 114 The Standing Committee
took great care throughout years of revisions to ensure that the
language of the rule gives adequate notice of the type of behavior
prohibited, without infringing on any attorney's constitutional
rights. The following discussion illustrates that, in addition to
serving as a policy statement, the rule is also crafted to combat
bias in the profession while conforming to constitutional
requirements.
III. ANALYSIS

Critics of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) are concerned with its
constitutionality. Some believe it violates the First Amendment,
while others reason it is not drafted specifically enough to comport
with due process and notice.
A. COMPLYING WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Although Rule 8.4(g) garnered widespread support, members of
the legal community also expressed concerns, specifically with
First Amendment issues surrounding freedom of association,
freedom of religion, and freedom of speech. 11 5
1. Freedom of Association and Religion. Lawyers are allowed
to choose their own clients.11 6 Opponents of the rule worry that
8.4(g) will infringe upon this right and punish lawyers for "acting
in accordance with their professional and moral judgment when
making decisions about whether to accept, reject, or withdraw
from certain cases" by forcing them to affirmatively take cases the
114 See supra notes 51-53 (noting that thirteen states have adopted an anti-bias provision
in comment form, and twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted a black
letter rule reflecting Model Rule 8.4's language).
115 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.'); see also GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, paras. IV-V, IX (providing
Georgia's Constitutional guarantees of the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and right
to assemble and petition, respectively).
116 See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 573 ("[A] lawyer may refuse to represent
a client for
any reason at all.").
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117
Traditionally, the
lawyers would have otherwise rejected.
decision to reject a client has been left to the attorney in order to
11
promote the legitimate need for zealous advocacy. 8 A lawyer who
feels fundamentally uncomfortable with representing a certain
client, the logic goes, will be unable to effectively advocate for his
client. 119 The ABA Model Rules echo this principle, and comment
[5] to Rule 8.4(g) spells out that "limiting the scope or subject
matter of the lawyer's practice or by limiting the lawyer's practice
to members of underserved populations" does not violate the anti120
bias rule.
Proper application of Rule 8.4(g) should largely relieve this
constitutional concern. A violation of 8.4(g) exists only when a
client is rejected solely because of his membership in a protected
group. 121 For example, a lawyer may refuse to assist a Hispanic
individual on death row because she does not wish to represent a
client in a capital case; the lawyer cannot refuse representation
because that individual is Hispanic. This is consistent with the
legal reasoning of the Massachusetts Commission Against
1 22 In Stropnicky, a
Discrimination in Stropnicky v. Nathanson.
potential male client sought to contract with a female attorney for
his divorce proceeding. The female attorney refused to represent
him because she claimed to limit her practice to only representing
123 The court rejected her
female clients in divorce proceedings.
limitation and found it discriminatory, fining her $5,000.124 The
court reasoned that, had the female attorney limited her scope for
117 Memorandum from 52 ABA member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm., supra
note 101, at 8.
118 See Dorothy Williams, Attorney Association: Balancing Autonomy and AntiDiscrimination, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 271, 271-73 (2016) ("Traditionally, lawyers have had
broad freedom of association in the practice of law. They have had the right to choose whom
to represent, rejecting a client for any reason. . . . [A]utonomy is essential for the attorney
because he is duty bound to 'zealously... advocate a client's cause.' ").
119 See id. at 273 ('This burden would be much harder to meet if the attorney seriously
disagreed with the client's cause.... [R]epresenting a client with whom he disagreed could
be extremely draining on the attorney, possibly affecting his performance.').
120 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT r 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) ("A lawyer must act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf.').
121 Gillers, supra note 33, at 226.
122 Stropnicky v. Nathanson, No. 91-BPA-0061, 1997 Mass. Comm'n Discrim. LEXIS 12,
at *1 (Feb. 25, 1997).
at *2-3.
123 Id.
124 Id. at "16-17.
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a legitimate reason other than the male client's sex-for example,
because she did not feel comfortable with particular facts of his
case-the rejected representation may have not been deemed
discriminatory but rather a legitimate exercise of professional
125
autonomy in choosing one's own clients.
The concern then turns to mistaken application of 8.4(g).
Returning to the previous example, how do we know that the
lawyer rejected the death penalty case based on the claim, and not
on the ethnicity of the individual? Opponents speculate that the
difficulty in. assessing the subjective motivation of an attorney's
decision will lead to unwarranted disciplinary proceedings-the
lawyer who happens to reject a capital case will be deemed
ethnically discriminatory. 126 The letter written in opposition to the
ABA during the drafting process did not offer examples from other
states that have black letter versions of previous comment [3] in
which a state bar or court sanctioned a lawyer for discriminatorily
rejecting representation. 127 Other scholars admit that freedom of
association concerns have yielded very little disciplinary action. 128
The absence of disciplinary actions against attorneys in this
context suggests that courts and state bar panels may be equipped
to tell the difference; alternatively, it may lead to the conclusion
that misconduct complaints are simply not filed arbitrarily. The
simplest solution to combat mistaken disciplinary action in
coincidental rejection is for attorneys to log why they reject
potential clients. 129 This quick action could safeguard their
practices by providing a simple and accurate explanation in the
face of a disciplinary claim filed under 8.4(g).
Still, a concern lies that Rule 8.4(g) prohibits an attorney from
refusing to represent an individual based on his own moral
conscience when the rejection is based solely upon an individual's
Id.
See Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts ConsideringModel Rule 8.4(g), 30
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 261-62 (2017) (criticizing the "trust-us" logic in response to
concerns about frivolous claims).
127 See generally Memorandum from 52 ABA Members to the ABA Standing Comm., supra
note 101.
128 See Williams, supra note 118, at 272 (citing absence of disciplinary actions as a
prevailing reason for a lack of scholarship on the freedom of association).
129 But see Amy B. Letouraneau,
Comment, Stropnicky v. Nathanson: Choosy
Massachusetts Lawyers, Choose Your Fights with Care!, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 125, 126
(1998) (raising the point that such a practice is tedious and disgruntling to busy and
overburdened attorneys).
125

126
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membership of a protected class. 130 For example, an attorney
refusing to represent an individual due to sexual orientation or
gender identity based on his religious beliefs violates Rule
13 1
8.4(g).
Tangential to this concern, Rule 8.4(g) does explicitly provide
that the rule does not interfere with Model Rule 1.16, which
provides in pertinent part: "(b)... a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if ... (4) the client insists upon taking action
that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has
a fundamental disagreement."' 132 This rule shields lawyers from
pursuing unwanted legal tactics-but not unwanted clients. It is
true that "[w]hile lawyers are technically detached from their
clients' moral choices, they still have to live with their decisions to
represent clients." 133 The inquiry thus turns to whether a lawyer
could raise a legitimate First Amendment defense in response to a
disciplinary proceeding fitting the context of the situation
described above.
In the
First Amendment protection is not limitless.1 34
1 35 a photographer, baker, and
aftermath of Obergefell v. Hodges,
owners of a wedding venue have lost on religious freedom claims in
rejecting potential business clients based on their same-sex couple
status. 136 Attorneys are entitled to full First Amendment rights,
just like other citizens, even as participants in the administration
of justice.1 37 Still, First Amendment rights are constitutionally
130 See Memorandum from 52 ABA Member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm., supra
note 101, at 8 (speculating that attorneys will face discipline "for acting in accordance with
their professional and moral judgment").
131See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 33, at 231-32 (posing a similar hypothetical and acquiescing
that "Rule 8.4(g) would indeed restrict lawyers like [her]" (alteration in original)).
132 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

133Williams, supra note 118, at 274 (citing WOLFRAM, supranote 8, at 571-75).
134 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (noting that First Amendment rights can
be restricted when such restriction would further a compelling state interest).
135Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding prohibitions on marriage
between same-sex couples unconstitutional).
136Elane Photography, LLC v. Whillock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013); Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 379 P.3d 272, 277 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied sub nom.
Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027
(Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), and cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017); Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 426 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2016).
137Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) ("It is ... important both to
society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to think, speak, and act as
members of an Independent Bar.").
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restricted when there exists "a compelling state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate. 138
State bars do have a compelling interest in
preventing prejudice in the administration of justice. 139 Generally,
however, an individual enjoys the "choice to enter into and
maintain certain intimate or private relationships," protected
against government interference.1 40
To regulate private
relationships, interference not only has to be justified by a
compelling government interest, but it also must be narrowly
tailored to protect freedom of association. 4 1
Constitutional
doctrine distinguishes between intimate relationships and
business enterprises.1 42 "Determining the limits of state authority
over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular
association ...unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where
that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal
attachments."'1 43 Business enterprises, therefore, are different
than familial relationships in the type of constitutional protection
144
afforded.
At first it may seem intuitive to categorize the attorney-client
relationship as deeply intimate, like the relationship between two
family members. 145 However, consider the photographer whose

18 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).

139See, e.g., In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1982) (explaining that the state has a
substantial interest in ensuring fairness of judicial proceedings for both the defendant and
the public).
140 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987).
141 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("Infringements [on the
freedom of association] may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.").
142 Id. at 620 ("Mhe Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to
control the section of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the choice of
one's fellow employees.").
143 Id.
144 Id. at 619-20 (contrasting the two relationships).
145 See, e.g., Samuel Stonefield, Lawyer Discrimination Against Clients: Outright
Rejection-No; Limitations on Issues and Arguments-Yes, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 103, 128
(1998) ("Given the intense and personal nature of the lawyer-client relationship, an
attorney might claim an analogous right to choose the clients with whom to associate, free
of statutory requirements.').
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religious freedom claim failed. 146 A co-owner refused to take
photos of a same-sex couple because she was personally opposed to
same-sex marriage. 147 Like the legal representation of a client,
photographing a momentous life event is an intimate action; not
intimate in the sense that a familial relationship is, but rather in
Both clients and service
the context of business proximity.
providers work closely together, in a one-on-one context between
two private parties, yet still at arms-length. Given the similarities
between the two circumstances, it seems likely that a First
Amendment defense against a disciplinary proceeding based on
discriminatory rejection of a potential client will probably not
1 48
prevail.
Similar constitutional concerns
2.
Freedom of Speech.
surrounding freedom of association are raised in opposition to
8.4(g) regarding free speech. Opponents fear the effect of "chilling'
speech-worrying that attorneys will be forced to walk on
politically-correct 1 49 eggshells to avoid offending anyone in fear of
disciplinary action. Illustrative case law, however, shows this may
be a weaker claim. 150 Courts often give bar associations deference
to regulate speech. 15 The Model Rules already prohibit lawyers
from certain kinds of speech. For example, the rules limit what a
lawyer may allude to at trial and prohibit lawyers from making
false statements about judges and judicial candidates. 52 The
policy goals behind these rules are the same policies 8.4(g) aims to
14 See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (holding that a
private company's refusal to photograph a same-sex ceremony violated the New Mexico
Human Rights Act, a neutral law of general applicability).
147

Id.

See Gillers, supra note 33, at 232; contra Blackman, supra note .126, at 243 ("At
bottom, the defenders of the model rule can only urge us to trust the disciplinary
committees. The First Amendment demands more.'.
149 Eugene Volokh, A Speech Code for Lawyers, Banning Viewpoints that Express 'Bias'
Including in Law-Related Social Activities, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/a-speech-code-for-lawyers-banning-vi
ewpoints-that-express-bias-including-in-law-related-social-activities-2 ("And, of course, the
speech restrictions are overtly viewpoint-based: If you express pro-equality viewpoints,
you're fine; if you express the contrary viewpoints, you're risking disciplinary action.").
150 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 1074, 1077 (Fla. 2001) (disciplining an
attorney for insults based in sex, race, and ethnicity); In re Schiff, 579 N.Y.S.2d 242, 242
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (censuring an attorney for directing "vulgar, obscene and sexist
epithets" towards his opposing counsel).
151 Blackman, supra note 126, at 262.
152 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT rr. 1.6(a), 1.9(c), 3.4(e), 3.4(f), 3.6, 4.2,
8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
148
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achieve-the need to153"protect the fairness of and public confidence
in the legal system."
Another concern related to free speech is that Rule 8.4(g) may
infringe upon lawyers' First Amendment right when the speech is
unrelated to the administration of justice. 154 Professionals worry
about how 8.4(g)'s broad scope will affect their private speech-for
example, when they utter slurs in private conversation or make a
derogatory comment at a bar association or social event.155
Opponents argue that the attenuation of free speech is too great to
serve the policy goals behind the regulation. 156 They point to the
157
risk of "chilling" speech.

However, context matters. Objections submitted to the ABA
during consideration of Rule 8.4(g)'s adoption called the rule "pure
speech code," and referenced two cases from Indiana to illustrate
this concern.158 In In re Kelley, an Indiana court sanctioned an
attorney for asking if someone was "gay" during a telephone

conversation.1 59 The second case, In re McCarthy, involved a
disciplinary action against an attorney who used a racial epithet in
an e-mail with another attorney's secretary.1 60 Both actions fell
under the Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g), which
forbids attorneys from "engag[ing] in conduct, in a professional
capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based

upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual
16
orientation, age, socioeconomic status, or similar factors." '
Read in isolation, the incidents perhaps seem innocuous.
However, factual context shows why the court felt these instances
16-Gillers, supra note

33, at 235.
Lindsey Keiser, Note, Lawyers Lack Liberty: State Codifications of Comment 3 of Rule
8.4 Impinge on Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 629, 629-30
(2015); see also Blackman, supra note 126, at 257 ("As drafted, the rule could discipline a
wide range of speech on matters of public concern at events with only the most dubious
connection with the practice of law. Though these laws may survive a facial challenge, they
are quite vulnerable to individual challenges.").
1I5 See Blackman, supra note 126, at 243 (noting that conversations at CLE events and
bar association dinners will be subject to the rule).
156 Id. (considering the sanctioning of a derogatory comment to be too attenuated to serve
policies).
157 See id. ('The threat of sanction will inevitably chill speech on matters of public concern.'.
158 Memorandum from 52 ABA Member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm., supra
164

note 101, at 7.
159 925 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. 2010).
160 938 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 2010).
161 IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RULE 8.4(g) (West 2017).
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warranted discipline. In Kelley, the two attorneys were engaged in
business negotiations, and the insensitive question was abrupt
and unrelated to the negotiation at hand. 162 The inquiry was not
just small talk-rather, the question was asked in the same way
one might ask a person's religious affiliation or ethnicity, based on
the given tone of voice. 163 In the McCarthy case, the attorney's email read:
I know you must do your bosses [sic] bidding at his
direction, but I am here to tell you that I am neither
you [sic] or his n****r. You do not tell me what to do.
You ask. If you ever act like that again, it will be the
last time I give any thought to your existence and your
boss will have to talk to me. Do we understand each
164
other?
Given the combative and hostile tone of the e-mail, it is more likely
that the epithet was intended to "invoke the subordinate status of
a racial group"1 65 rather than to apply a "racially derogatory term
to himself."1 66 The context of regulated speech matters because it
reinforces that the policy goals surrounding regulation of attorney
speech are being met and weakens any First Amendment freedom
of speech argument.
B. ADEQUATE NOTICE AND DUE PROCESS

The second major constitutional objection to Rule 8.4(g) is that
it is too broad in scope; therefore, it is unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague. 167 State and federal laws, as well as
disciplinary rules, must give adequate notice as to what type of
behavior they prohibit to comport with constitutional due

162

Kelley, 925 N.E.2d at 1279.

16 Id.; see also Gillers, supra note 33, at 221 (speculating that counsel posed the question

to gain "strategic value').
164 McCarthy, 938 N.E.2d at 698.
16 Gillers, supra note 33, at 222 (noting that the race of neither individual is identifiedand considering such information misses the point).
16 Memorandum from 52 ABA Member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm., supra
note 101, at 7.
167 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (noting the basic rule that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined).
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process. 168 If an individual cannot determine what conduct is
prohibited from the language of the rule, it becomes difficult to
properly conform behavior to the rule. Further, it leaves open the
possibility for arbitrary enforcement because the rule can be
interpreted in disparate ways. 169 Courts examining a prohibitive
rule or law look to whether it is "set out in terms that the ordinary
person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently
understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public
1 70
interest" to determine vagueness.
The former comment [3] used the phrase "prejudicial to the
administration of justice" to describe the prohibited conduct. 171 The
Fifth Circuit rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to former
comment [3]'s language in Howell v. State Bar of Texas.1 72 The
court wrote that "[t]he particular context in which a regulation is
promulgated [is] ... important.... The [one] at issue herein applies

only to lawyers, who are professionals and have the benefit of
guidance provided by case law, court rules and the 'lore of the
profession.' "173
Because courts may now have to face similar
challenges to Model Rule 8.4(g)'s new language, the Fifth Circuit's
holding is worth noting because a similar rationale could be applied
to an attorney's objections to fair notice. Rule 8.4(g) now prohibits
"conduct that ... is harassment or discrimination ... related to the
practice of law."1 74 The concerns regarding the overreaching scope
of "discrimination," "harassment," and "related to the practice of
law" are addressed in turn.
1. Defining Discrimination. The new comment [3] to Rule 8.4
defines discrimination as "harmful verbal or physical conduct that
manifests bias or prejudice," and suggests substantive
antidiscrimination case law as a guide for application of the
term. 175 Comment [3] uses the word "includes," which suggests
168 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived... without due process of
law."); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. I ('No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
except by due process of law.").
169 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (discussing the policy matters behind the arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement concerns).
170 U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579 (1973).
171 Rep. of the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, supra note 38, at 81.
172 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding as constitutional a state disciplinary rule

for attorneys).
173 Id. (citation omitted).
174

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

175

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
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that the given definition is not exhaustive. 176 Although intentional
discrimination is fairly well-established and codified, 177 a concern
lies in the application of the definition of unintentional
employment discrimination. 178 Gillers explains,
[i]f... the goal is to include even unintentional
discrimination as a basis for professional discipline
whenever a lawyer should have known (but does not
know. .. ) that a facially neutral employment policy
will have a discriminatory effect, it runs into the
criticism that doing so misuses the disciplinary process
committees into shadow
and turns discipline
79
antidiscrimination agencies.
The unease turns on the actual enforcement of 8.4(g) and what a
state bar or court decides a lawyer should reasonably be expected
to know. 8 0 Like the Fifth Circuit mentioned, vagueness should be
considered in context,' 8 ' and lawyers by trade are responsible for
complying with ethical standards, as well as retaining particular
knowledge in the interpretation of language. 8 2 Even so, to curtail
the apprehension that Rule 8.4(g) will be used to transform
disciplinary proceedings into quasi-antidiscrimination proceedings
176 Id.; see also Gillers, supra note 33, at 217 ("[W]hile a definition is welcome, the one
offered here.., is open-ended.").
177 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (defining unlawful discriminatory practices by
employers under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (defining unlawful discriminatory
housing practices under the Fair Housing Act).
178 The brief submitted by fifty-two ABA members in opposition to the rule argues that the
definition of the term is vague because, unlike other statutes, Rule 8.4(g) does not list in
specific detail what exactly constitutes "discrimination." Memorandum from 52 ABA
Member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm., supra note 101, at 16-18. The argument
seems circular, however, because the text of the comments accompanying the new rule
suggests that definitions in substantive law, laws which the brief points to as exemplary,
may serve as guidance in application of the rule. Furthermore, the ABA Model Rules are
purposefully designed to be stylistically succinct, and this is partially why explanatory
comments are left out of the black letter rule.
179 See Gillers, supra note 33, at 218 (weighing the value of a mens rea requirement
against potential pitfalls).
180 Memorandum from 52 ABA Member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm., supra
note 101, at 14 ("[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them.').
18' Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The particular context
in which a regulation is promulgated therefore is all important.").
182 ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 ann. (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("Competence
includes the ability to analyze relevant rules and principles and apply them ....).
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(perhaps in substitution for a weak civil claim), Georgia could
prospectively adopt a comment that limits application to
intentional discrimination only.
2. Defining Harassment. The new comment [3] to Rule 8.4 also
helps to define harassment by enumerating what types of actions
constitute the term, specifically sexual harassment.18 3 Like its
definition of "discrimination," the Model Rule's definition of
"harassment" is drafted to use the word "includes" instead of "is" to
modify the description of actions, which leaves the list of actions
open-ended, as opposed to exclusive.18 4 The Ethics Committee
drafted the term to be "evaluated in terms of the reasonable
perception of the victims of such conduct." 18 5 Those in opposition
to the rule do not find the definition satisfactory, and they pose
questions of degree relating to "harassment." For example, critics
question whether a single act may constitute harassment, whether

body language could surmount to harassment, whether
disagreeing with beliefs rises to the requisite level, and whether
someone merely taking offense to a comment violates the rule.18 6
The constitutional due process concern does not seem to be in the
word itself, but in the matter of degree in which it would be
applied as a rule violation. Critics worry that the fear of offending
18 7
someone will chill speech.

Courts that have sanctioned attorney discipline under broader
ethical language overlook this critical argument of Rule 8.4(g). For
example, in In Re Schiff, a lawyer was sanctioned under a New
York rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct that

183 MODEL

RULES

OF PROF'L CONDUCT

r.

8.4

cmt.

3

(AM.

BAR

ASS'N

2016)

("[I]ncludes ... derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct. Sexual harassment
includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.").
184 Id. ("(D]iscrimination includes harmful verbal or physical conduct that manifests bias
or prejudice towards others.").
185 See Memorandum from the Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, supra
note 49, at 4 (explaining why the committee chose to use the terms "harassment" and
"discrimination").
186 Memorandum from 52 ABA Member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm., supra
note 101, at 15 ("Does expressing disagreement with someone's religious beliefs constitute
harassment based on... religion? Can merely being offended... constitute harassment?
Can a single act constitute harassment... ?").
187 Id. at 16 ("[The Rule's] vagueness will chill the speech of attorneys who, not knowing
where harassment begins and ends, will be forced to censor their free speech rights in an
effort to avoid inadvertently violating the Rule.").
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"reflects adversely on [the lawyer's] fitness to practice law."1 88
This language is arguably more elusive than 8.4(g), since the rule
does not define "reflects adversely" in any sense. Rather, courts
must engage in a line-drawing process by determining what a
reasonable attorney would consider as prohibited conduct.
Without this line-drawing process, rules would be too difficult to
draft because it would be impossible to enumerate every instance
of misconduct. In rejecting the constitutional void-for-vagueness
challenge, the court in Schiff implicitly affirmed In re Holtzman,
577 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1991). As in Schiff, the New York Court of
Appeals recognized in Holtzman that broad regulation of
professional conduct is often necessary to avoid an unachievable
18 9
laundry-list.
In fact, many other ABA Model Rules use similarly broad
language. For example, the phrases "substantial likelihood" and
"reasonable possibility" are found within the text of the rules. 190
While precise drafting is constitutionally necessary and useful in
application, it is not a science. The consideration that ethical rules
cannot fathomably include every single type of prohibited
behavior, coupled with the belief that lawyers have a unique
ability to interpret the meaning of a word within a rule, weakens
the argument that "harassment" is overly vague. Rather than
expounding on every conceivable situation within the text of the
rule, a court or state bar may need to draw a line in isolated
instances based on the particular facts in the case.
3. Defining "Related to the Practice of Law." Rule 8.4(g)
certainly has a broad scope; in fact, one of the underlying
objectives in passing 8.4(g) was to reach a broader category of
misconduct and to provide disciplinary recourse for unacceptable
behavior. 191 Rule 8.4(g) uses the phrase "conduct related to the
practice of law" to include not only conduct related to the

188 In re Schiff, 599 N.Y.S. 242, 242-43 (N.Y: App. Div. 1993). The rule is now 8.4(h) in
the New York Rules of Professional Conduct.
189 In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991) ("[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to
enumerate and define, with legal precision, every offense for which an attorney or
counsellor ought to be removed." (quoting Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 14 (1956)).

190 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N, amended 2002); r. 4.3 (AM.

BAR ASS'N 1983).
191 Drafters debated and carefully considered the scope of the rule's language throughout the
drafting process. See supra Part II.B (discussing the drafting process and scope of the rule).
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representation of a client, but also to law offices, professional
192
meetings, bar committees, and legal social events.
Objectors point out that "for the first time, the new
rule... subject[s] attorneys to discipline for engaging in conduct
that neither adversely affects the attorney's fitness to practice law
nor seriously interferes with the proper and efficient operation of
the judicial system," thereby regulating purely private conduct. 193
Critics take issue that the rule does not require proof showing
prejudice to the administration of justice and only limits rule
violations by showing of any "relation" to the practice of law.1 94
One scholar points to examples of disciplinary proceedings in
states with a rule similar to 8.4(g) to show that disciplined conduct
happened in the context of law-related settings, rather than in
social contexts. 195 The author seeks to show that this overbreadth
scope is unnecessary, but the observation tends to show that the
rule is being applied properly. Again, concerns with the scope of
the new rule are tied-up in freedom of speech and freedom of
association concerns-lawyers worry that they will have to curtail
their private speech at social events to avoid potential sanctions
under 8.4(g).
One safeguard against this concern is Rule 8.4(g)'s requirement
that a lawyer knows or reasonably should know her speech or
conduct constitutes harassment or discrimination. The knowledge
requirement works to combat "overaggressive prosecutions" and
strives to put apprehensive lawyers at ease. 196 Certainly, this is
no guarantee of immunity for a lawyer who, at a firm happy hour,
carelessly engages in words or conduct that amounts to
harassment or discrimination when she should have reasonably
known it would violate Rule 8.4(g). Still, the rule is justified
because lawyers are officers of the court and enjoy a privilege to
practice law. 197 While this new, broad definition reaches beyond
what conduct other ABA Model Rules monitor, proponents of 8.4(g)
192 See supra Part II.B.1 (noting that current state versions of a black letter version of
Rule 8.4(g) do not broaden the scope as wide as the ABA's version).
193Memorandum from 52 ABA Member Attorneys to the ABA Standing Comm., supra
note 101, at 6.
194 Id. at 6-7.
195 Blackman, supra note 126, at 256 (referencing In re Schiff as an example).
196 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Revised Resol. 109 Rep., supra note 48,
at 8.
197 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) (noting
special responsibilities and duties that come with practicing law).
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felt a carefully drafted anti-bias rule would be the best way to
advance the profession, its integrity, and its commitment to
justice.
IV.

CONCLUSION

After twenty years of debate, widespread support for a tool to
further address discrimination and harassment in the field of law
finally prevailed. As of August 2016, Georgia should now consider
adopting the text of Model Rule 8.4(g) and its accompanying
comments [3]-[5] into the state ethics code. It has several strong
incentives to do so. The rule sends a message-to both the public
and attorneys alike-that the state of Georgia does not tolerate
The rule also provides a remedy for
biased behavior.
inappropriate behavior that would otherwise skirt by, especially
since Georgia's Rule 8.4 lacks a "prejudicial to the administration
of justice" provision. Furthermore, Georgia faces the opportunity
to join the national majority of states in this endeavor, leaving
behind the increasingly small group of states that lack any sort of
rule to combat discrimination and harassment.
No rule will ever achieve perfection because language is an art
and not an exact science. However, Rule 8.4(g) drafters carefully
considered constitutional issues and sought to address these
concerns. The rule comports with both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution, as well as Georgia's
Sound interpretation of Rule 8.4(g)'s language
Constitution.
inappropriate conduct that currently pervades
targets
accurately
activities and settings related to the practice of law. The rule
serves as a prophylactic tool, and reasonable application will cabin
the scope of the rule and safeguard against concerns of chilled
speech and freedom to choose clients. In all, Model Rule 8.4(g)
does not seriously disturb lawyers' rights-rather, 8.4(g) expands
citizens' and attorneys' right to seek redress for biased behavior
and strengthens the integrity of the practice of law.
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